(Communists and compared neostalinisti)
scenario of civil war in Libya, the imperialist interference, the extreme uncertainty, information on events in progress, have become the starting point Used in some circles of the left to question the very existence of the Libyan revolution and beautify the reality of the Gaddafi regime. "And 'civil war, not a revolt, let alone a revolution. " " It 's been organized by imperialism, there is nothing spontaneous in contrast to Tunisia and Egypt " There are social demands in the movement against Gaddafi, but only policies. " " Gaddafi has held an anti-imperialist regime, so you want to chase ." A Benghazi waves the flag of the old monarchy of King Idris, this would be a revolution? . And so on ...
These positions - expressed in forms other areas of the old guard of Il Manifesto, from the Stalinist Fed, and the Communist Network - are emblematiche della totale confusione di merito e di metodo presente nel bagaglio teorico della tradizione stalinista. E soprattutto dei risvolti politici controrivoluzionari di questo bagaglio.
E' bene dunque provare a fare chiarezza. Tanto più in un momento storico in cui l'ascesa della rivoluzione araba scuote l'intero ordine internazionale e pone al movimento operaio e ai comunisti rivoluzionari una nuova frontiera di intervento politico e di battaglia strategica.
IL REGIME DI GHEDDAFI ALLE SUE ORIGINI: UN BONAPARTISMO “ANTIMPERIALISTA”
La prima considerazione è di carattere storico. Il colpo di stato degli Ufficiali liberi nel 1969 in Libia ebbe sicuramente un connotato “antimperialista”, per as distorted by its military character. But you can not ignore the real nature of the regime and, moreover, its dynamic historical regression in the last 20 years? The overthrow of the old military
Libyan monarchy of King Idris in '69 took place in the more general movement of decolonization developed after World War II: a movement that found a gap in the existence of the USSR and international expansion of its area of \u200b\u200binfluence to 'inside of the same Arab nation. Like the regime of Ben Bella and Boumedienne in Algeria then, and Nasser in Egypt (which, however, Gaddafi was inspired), the new power of Libyan officials realized undoubtedly progressive social measures: erased the vestiges of Italian colonialism, foreign military bases closed, partly nationalized foreign banks (with the acquisition of majority stakes, took possession of the oil resources of the country, launched social protection measures. It was more than sufficient for the condemnation of Gaddafi by imperialism. But it was not the "socialism" - as claimed by the Stalinist parties Arabs to justify their capitulation to nationalism - not the workers' power and popular. On the contrary.
Gaddafi On the ground preserved a social market economy, both albeit with a strong presence of public control: moreover, the "third universal theory" as its called Gaddafi dottrina sociale - con la tradizionale modestia - riconosceva apertamente il principio della proprietà privata (“sancito dal Corano”) in polemica col “comunismo totalitario”. Sul terreno politico eresse sulle rovine della vecchia monarchia un proprio regime militare e dispotico, basato sulla mistica del Capo; sulla negazione delle libertà democratiche più elementari dei lavoratori e delle masse (niente libertà sindacale, niente libertà di sciopero, niente libero confronto delle opinioni politiche nello stesso campo antimperialista...); sulla irrigimentazione attiva della società libica attraverso specifiche strutture di controllo sociale e poliziesco (i cosiddetti “comitati popolari” strettamente subject to Gaddafi as a sort of his private militia), with the balance (and between) the clans (such as never put into question, but rather taken as the power system interface), the systematic annihilation of all forms military even masked or potential opposition to absolutism (traditional Islamic Ulema from the clergy, members of the opposition to the weak domestic policy). The same "new constitution" solemnly promised by Gaddafi at the time of the overthrow of the monarchy, remained a dead letter in 40 years: and replaced by the creed of Yamahiriyya (1976) and the messianic religion of the Green Paper, of course, hand written by the Chief.
E 'is therefore completely already clear in the 70 and 80 the communist revolutionaries were certainly defend Libya's Gaddafi (as Nasser's Egypt, as Boumedienne of Algeria ...) threat of imperialism, but they could not in any way identify petit-bourgeois Bonapartist regimes in the military, or embellish the reality of those regimes. On the contrary, they had to act as opposition to the proletarian Bonapartist around a program of anti-social revolution and workers' democracy and popular: the only perspective that can consolidate and make up completely the same anti-imperialist democratic revolution. This was indeed the policy of strict independence of the class that Marx claimed against the revolutionary democracy petty bourgeois and a possible government (see address to the League of Communists in 1850) and the Communist International of Lenin and Trotsky applied towards nationalism "anti-imperialist" or semi-colonial countries (v.il 2nd Congress of the 3 rd International Symposium on the colonial question, 1920). The Stalinist bureaucracy would reverse this setting.
Adaptation of Stalinism during the Second World War, the Arab nationalism of petty bourgeois military sectors in the Middle East, was a crime against the Arab revolution and his own anti-imperialist aspirations. All Bonapartist regimes' anti-imperialist "backed by Moscow, and made possible by the existence USSR, ended one after the other with back nell'alveo imperialism and Zionism with the subordinate. A process already started in the '70s and '80s (performed by Sadat and then Mubarak in Egypt), and completed after the fall of the Berlin Wall and Stalinism internationally.
the parable of Gaddafi: FROM BONAPARTE "ANTINMPERIALISTA" A business partner (and crimes) Imperial
Gaddafi's regime was no exception. Subject still imperialist military aggression in 1986 (with the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi on the American side), and even internationally isolated in the early '90s (with the heavy international sanctions of 92-93), the scheme worked for its integration into the new international order, until his "rehabilitation" official in 2003. The end of the umbrella protection of the Kremlin, the imperialist aggression against Iraq in '91, the growing pressure of Islamic fundamentalism threatening the borders (Algeria) with a risk of penetration in Libya, Gaddafi urged in a short time a radical relocation policy. It embarked on a plan of internal liberalization, reopened its doors to foreign banks, offered lavish concessions to imperialism in the same oil field, he gave lavish contracts in the field of infrastructure capital to Italian and French, took on the role of gendarme of the ruthless policies xenophobia in the EU, opened to relax with Egypt and the Zionist state. Asking in return not only the renunciation of imperialism to overthrow the regime, but an area of \u200b\u200bactive involvement in the financial capital of the West: Libya, the first Italian bank's main shareholder (Unicredit) states in this context.
This change has had important consequences in Libya. At the oppressive nature of the dictatorship has been added to the considerable growth of social inequality, compared to salaries stops already twenty years. On the one hand, liberalization and privatization, coupled with the growing communion business with the capitalists of Europe, have increased the social privilege of the caste system from the family (wide) Gadhafi of making the political abuse of power even more obnoxious. For another, the maintenance of social assistance could not prevent the significant increase in youth unemployment (especially intellectual), a feature common to all countries of the Maghreb. The per capita income in Libya is certainly higher than in Tunisia and Egypt, but only through the traditional media of chicken. Finally, the social mixing triggered by increasing integration with foreign capital has eroded the old tribal and territorial balance, atavistic multiplying contradictions and tensions (particularly between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania), to the detriment of the stability of the regime and the unity of the army.
The truth is that Libya's history and its parable is a further lesson for all the supporters, more or less uncritically, the military regimes of "progressive" (at Chavez, for instance). Not only do these schemes do not achieve or can achieve, by definition, the power of workers and the masses, but their own autonomy from imperialism is inevitably partial, fragile, transient, sooner or later exposed to the ebb of normalization. This is the reality of the current regime of Gaddafi. Do not see it, and continue to repeat 40 years later, albeit with understandable caution, the old mythology of the Lion of the desert, do not mean any stock of past mistakes and to disarm the revolutionary politics against the backdrop of the new revolution araba.
LA SOLLEVAZIONE POPOLARE IN LIBIA: “GUERRA CIVILE” O “RIVOLUZIONE”? TANTA CONFUSIONE SOTTO IL CIELO
Ma c'è di più. Dopo aver rimosso in sede “logica” la base materiale di una possibile rivoluzione libica (se Gheddafi è antimperialista e le masse vivono bene grazie ai sussidi, perché dovrebbero fare una rivoluzione?) gli intellettuali neostaliniani negano in sede empirica l'evidenza stessa della rivoluzione in corso: si tratterebbe tuttalpiù di una “guerra civile”, ordita e preordinata dietro le quinte; e in ogni caso come si può chiamare “rivoluzione” l'innalzamento della bandiera monarchica?
Questa costruzione è un non senso. Che somma in sé l'assoluta incomprensione della realtà storica delle rivoluzioni, con l'assoluta incomprensione della concretezza degli avvenimenti in corso. Soffermiamoci su entrambi gli aspetti.
Non so come i compagni Burgio , Cararo o Dinucci immaginano una rivoluzione. Pare che la immaginino come un percorso rettilineo, segnato dalla coscienza di massa, illuminato da un chiaro programma, sorretto da un blocco sociale omogeneo. (E per questo... rinviabile alla notte dei tempi). Disgraziatamente una simile rivoluzione è sconosciuta alla storia dell'umanità. Le rivoluzioni reali, non quelle immaginarie, sono processi molto complessi. Non sono sospinte dalla coscienza ma dal bisogno e dall'odio contro l'oppressione. Proprio perché mobilitano grandi masse (altrimenti non sarebbero rivoluzioni) trascinano nell'arena della lotta i più diversi strati sociali, le più diverse culture e tradizioni, ragioni e interessi profondamente contraddittori. Così è stato sempre. E tanto più quando la rivoluzione si leva contro regimi dittatoriali pluridecennali, che per loro natura hanno bloccato per lungo tempo ogni forma di dialettica pubblica e di selezione delle rappresentanze politiche, unificando contro di sé un indistinto moto democratico per la “libertà”. E' appena il caso di ricordare che la prima rivoluzione russa contro lo zarismo del 1905 iniziò sotto le insegne del prete Gapon (poi rivelatosi agente dello Zar)... Il compito dei comunisti non è quello di negare la rivoluzione perché non corrisponde ad una forma pura ideale (inesistente), ma di intervenire nelle rivoluzioni reali per sviluppare la loro coscienza , contrastare l'egemonia di forze politiche o culturali avverse (inevitabile nella prima fase), ricondurre le aspirazioni sociali e politiche progressive delle masse ad uno sbocco di classe anticapitalista.
Le rivoluzioni arabe in corso contro regimi ventennali (Tunisia), trentennali (Egitto), quarantennali (Libia), pongono ai comunisti esattamente questo problema. I processi in corso hanno caratteristiche diverse a seconda dei diversi contesti nazionali. In particolare sono different channels and political organizers of the uprising, and the dynamics of social forces. But wherever the true unifying banner of revolutionary movements immediately was not social but political: the overthrow of regimes, the overthrow of the oppressors. That is why the policy has aggregated flag around himself deeply contradictory names, which tend to capture the scene immediately after the overthrow of tyrants. The great rise of workers' strikes in Egypt, after the fall of Mubarak in the open collision with the "new" provisional military power (and the Egyptian bourgeoisie which supports it) is emblematic in this regard. The Libyan revolution falls, with its specificity, in this framework. The flag of unifying a large part of the Libyan society is facing in the fall of Gaddafi, the punishment of his crimes, the launch of a constitution, free elections. These are the traditional claims of a democratic revolution. The flag
"monarchical"? It 's just the Libyan flag as opposed to the green flag of the dictatorship. Gaddafi that before there was a monarchy in Libya (rightly overthrown in '69) is a fact. But the flag now under appeal by the masses against Gaddafi does not express the demand for the return of the family Idris. Besides, the royalist opposition is almost non-existent in Libya, and weak in emigration, as documented by the same old Del Boca. That flag represents in symbolic terms, in the desert of political and cultural references, the point of identification and aggregation available after 40 years of the regime against the regime. In the perception of mass is the symbol of a national democratic revolution, not a counter-revolution monarchy. You can not see it? A fact
"preordained and organized, unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, and thus the long arm of" foreign forces "?. It 's a conspiracy nonsense is typical of the Stalinist mentality that ignores the facts. The chronicle of the uprising in Benghazi, leader of the revolution, is now public domain, even in detail, however, confirmed by the most disperate fonti documentali e testimonianze. Le prime manifestazioni anti regime del 15 febbraio, convocate via internet, a base prevalentemente giovanile e studentesca, sono state aggredite a fucilate da forze mercenarie direttamente guidate da Karmis, figlio di Gheddafi, che ordinava all'esercito di partecipare alla repressione. L'orrore per la carneficina compiuta, in una città già colpita ripetutamente dalla violenza criminale del regime, ha prodotto la sollevazione popolare. Gli stessi comandi dell'esercito hanno a quel punto disertato gli ordini di Gheddafi, si sono ammutinati, e hanno aperto le caserme e i depositi d'armi, consentendo l'armamento popolare. Il giorno 20 Bengasi è stata liberata: e la sua liberazione ha prodotto un effetto domino throughout the east of Libya, with similar dynamics (uprising, mutiny of troops, armament popular). Where is all this the director of a devil mysterious occult? How can you not see that the revolution is the daughter of the Libyan Arab revolution, driven by the events in Tunisia and Egypt, animated by the same desire for freedom and redemption that is going through, in different forms, all the Arab peoples? After describing the collapse of Stalinism in 89 as an international conspiracy of imperialism, as we want to represent the same plot of imperialism Arab revolution (against regimes allied imperialism ...)?
But Libya is "a civil war, not a rivoluzione”, si afferma. Ma perché, una rivoluzione non può forse trascinare con sé una guerra civile? Le grandi rivoluzioni della storia non sono state anche guerre civili? La rivoluzione inglese del 1640, la rivoluzione francese del 1789-93, la stessa rivoluzione russa dell'ottobre '17, non si sono risolte anche in guerre civili? La stessa guerra di liberazione in Italia nel 43-45 (tradita nelle sue aspirazioni rivoluzionarie dal PCI di Togliatti) non ha forse intrecciato sollevazione popolare e guerra civile? Si potrebbe continuare. E' vero: in Tunisia e in Egitto il primo passaggio della rivoluzione, con la caduta di Ben Alì e Mubarak, non ha comportato la guerra civile, nonostante le centinaia di morti assassinati; per il semplice fatto che in entrambi i casi la forza popolare ha paralizzato l'esercito, la polizia si è disgregata, lo stesso imperialismo ha premuto dall'esterno su forze militari da sé finanziate e influenzate perché evitassero un bagno di sangue dalle conseguenze imprevedibili, e cercassero di riprendere il controllo politico della situazione (cosa come si vede non facile né a Tunisi né a Il Cairo). In Libia è diverso, per un insieme di ragioni particolari: la famiglia Gheddafi non ha lo spazio di fuga disponibile per Ben Alì e Mubarak; il regime dispone, nella capitale, di uno spazio di arroccamento e tenuta militare superiore; Gheddafi controlla forze mercenarie consistenti; lo spazio di influenza e condizionamento politico of 'imperialism on Gaddafi and his military is, for historical reasons, much less than that carried on the Egyptian regime. In this context, the will to resist Gaddafi in Tripoli can drag a civil war (imperialism by offering an area of \u200b\u200bpossible intervention, just a lever in the absence of domestic policy). But why this civil war would eliminate the border between revolution and counterrevolution? Or you want to suggest, by implication, a policy of defending the revolution against the Gaddafi regime in Libya, in perfect harmony with the position taken by the regime of Chavez and Fidel Castro? In this case you gain clarity, and would have the courage to recruitment of responsibility. Certainly very challenging and revealing.
anticapitalist DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
course the full support of the Libyan revolution can not possibly lead to a naive expectation to events. The revolutionary overthrow of the Gaddafi regime is definitely a good thing but will not finish the revolution: on the contrary would open its new phase, full of uncertainties and contradictions, and therefore a new agenda of problems and tasks.
Also in Libya, as in Tunisia and Egypt - albeit with a much greater weakness and dispersion - different forces are at work involved to make the Libyan revolution to end a limited and partial or full the historic reconciliation with imperialism. The danger today is not by pan-Islamism, whose presence in the Arab revolution is now whole, very limited, and that is very marginal in the same Libya (Cyrenaica Senussia tradition is not fundamentalist). It is rather the work of the tribal areas who are interested in regaining control of the situation after the revolution - especially among young people - has shaken the dominion of the clan going beyond their borders. It comes from the military areas of the old regime who have abandoned the sinking ship, but they are not willing to give up their privileges and their social status. It comes from the enriched environment of the new Libyan grown up in the opening decade of imperialism, and often intertwined with the Western business world. These forces do not now have an axis of unification and a unique project, also because of their conflicting interests. But they have a common goal: secure the people's revolution, impede the full realization of its own democratic demands, however, prevent its trascrescenza in social revolution, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist. These are the same forces that may be interested intervention of imperialism in Libya, as a factor of political stabilization and restoration of order: an order without Gaddafi - now factor in civil war with all its risks - but it certainly marked the full restoration dominant hierarchies. The masses have arisen Libyan
an interest in the exact opposite, like the Tunisian and Egyptian masses: to prevent the betrayal of the revolution. From here, a program of action in response: to develop to the end its calls for democracy, since the demand for a truly free and sovereign Constituent Assembly that shirk clan leaders, generals, businessmen, the definition of the new political order, to develop free the people's committees who were born in Benghazi and Tabruk, broaden their social base, giving them an elective nature, progressive coordination at local and national, has already been freed from Libya: to make the tools of self-organization of workers and democratic of the people refuse to surrender their weapons ai nuovi generali, come pretendono i comandanti militari a Bengasi: ed anzi estendere l'armamento popolare, integrare parallelamente rappresentanze militari elette dai soldati nelle strutture dei comitati popolari, organizzare ovunque la propria forza indipendente. Contemporaneamente, sul piano sociale, si tratta di affermare un programma autonomo e complementare: respingere ogni apertura alle liberalizzazioni di mercato, revocare le liberalizzazioni già effettuate, nazionalizzare sotto il controllo dei lavoratori e senza indennizzo tutte le leve vitali dell'economia del paese, annullare tutti i patti subalterni realizzati dal regime con l'imperialismo (a partire dalla chiusura immediata dei campi di concentramento dei migranti d'Africa). La lotta per questo program will not only enshrine the political autonomy of the labor movement and popular by all the forces of the bourgeoisie in Libya, but would make an important contribution to the forward deployment of revolution, Egyptian and Tunisian, a crucial step.
AGAINST ALL WORK OF 'IMPERIALISM IN LIBYA. BUT NOT IN THE NAME OF THE REVOLUTION Gaddafi
E 'from this point of view, revolutionary, and not the opposite pro-Gaddafi, who is denounced and rejected any notion most clearly of imperialist intervention in Libya. If imperialism today is studying a possible intervention in Libya, Gaddafi is not because he wants to remove (also already given up). But because he wants to stop the Libyan revolution e l'estensione ulteriore della rivoluzione araba. Questo è il suo problema.
L'imperialismo non ha mai avuto scrupoli democratici e scopi umanitari. Tutta la sua storia ha militato contro la democrazia e contro l'umanità. La sua unica vocazione è il dominio sui popoli e il controllo sul pianeta. Non sono oggi le crudeltà del regime di Gheddafi a colpire la sensibilità di chi bombarda l'Afghanistan ed appoggia le barbarie del sionismo. Ma piuttosto l'instabilità politica della Libia, la messa a rischio delle sue riserve petrolifere, la possibilità di un ulteriore espansione del contagio rivoluzionario in Medio Oriente a tutto danno degli interessi strategici dell'imperialismo e dello Stato sionista, in uno scacchiere decisivo degli world balance, present and future. Intervening in Libya, behind the hypocritical pretext of humanitarian relief, it could mean regaining a lever in the whole Maghreb, developments and opportunities influence the political processes underway in the region, to weigh all the way its deterrent force. Moreover the same inter-imperialist contradictions pulling in the same direction. United States and Great Britain are the most active in supporting the view action, because they think to replace the imperialist interests most affected European (Italy and France), and open a wider channel of direct intervention in Africa according anticinese. France would like to avoid this maneuver, in defense of its old sphere of influence in Africa. But I do not know how. The Italian imperialism, the main victim of the fall of Gaddafi (and not just for the refugee issue) seek to recover the delay at the last minute to avoid being cut off from any division of spheres of influence. What 's the only real unifying element of imperialism in this elbowing of all against all? The settlement of the Arab revolution. For this same reason, the defense and development of the Arab revolution, not rare, should be the unifying element of all the consistent anti-imperialist forces. "Both the Libyan people arose to settle accounts with Gaddafi, not the old colonial powers against the Libyan people and the Arab"
This word is even more important in Italy, the old power dominatrix Libya today celebrates the centenary of the Italian colonial invasion exact from the government liberal "progressive" of Giolitti (1911), under the pressure of the Banco di Roma . "Hands off from Libya, full support for the Libyan revolution against Gaddafi and Italian imperialism" is the rightful claim of the labor movement in our country. In keeping with the opposition that the invasion of Libya Italian Socialist Party, argued in 1911. And as a true act of reparation against the barbaric oppression Italian on the Libyan people for nearly half a century (the extermination of the Libyan resistance, use of poison gas, launching of the concentration camps ... even then the "democratic" Giolitti). But this position makes sense if progressive moves by the support the revolution, not to counter (or untenable neutrality between the Libyan regime and the insurgent people).
COMMUNISTS IN THE FACE OF LIBYA AND STALIN: A REVEALING DISCUSSION
In conclusion. This confrontation on the issue between the Libyan revolutionary forces neostaliste, by no means simply a manifestation of a divergence occasional, albeit important, of "foreign policy." On the contrary: it represents, from a particular angle, the litmus test of opposing orientations.
Un partito rivoluzionario che assume il comunismo non come etichetta ideologica, ma come programma per la conquista del potere da parte dei lavoratori e delle masse - in Italia come su scala internazionale - è portato da questo stesso programma a riconoscere i processi rivoluzionari ovunque si manifestino, a difenderli, a intervenire sulle loro inevitabili contraddizioni, a cercare di sviluppare una loro direzione politica alternativa nella prospettiva del governo dei lavoratori e delle masse povere.
Gruppi o partiti che invece si richiamano al comunismo come eredità ideologica dello stalinismo, senza programma rivoluzionario, senza lotta reale per il potere, sono portati ad assumere come riferimento internazionale centrale non la dinamica reale della lotta Class and revolution, but political and diplomatic positioning of its "field" reference state: once the Soviet Union, even when in the name of the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy they were betraying the revolution or the English Italian resistance, and today, more modestly, China or Venezuela's Chavez, even when it means betraying (in this case, fortunately without consequences, direct) the Libyan revolution and Arabic.
And 'the proof, once again, the break with Stalinism and his school is the condition necessary to guide the revolutionary politics in the transition period we are living.
These positions - expressed in forms other areas of the old guard of Il Manifesto, from the Stalinist Fed, and the Communist Network - are emblematiche della totale confusione di merito e di metodo presente nel bagaglio teorico della tradizione stalinista. E soprattutto dei risvolti politici controrivoluzionari di questo bagaglio.
E' bene dunque provare a fare chiarezza. Tanto più in un momento storico in cui l'ascesa della rivoluzione araba scuote l'intero ordine internazionale e pone al movimento operaio e ai comunisti rivoluzionari una nuova frontiera di intervento politico e di battaglia strategica.
IL REGIME DI GHEDDAFI ALLE SUE ORIGINI: UN BONAPARTISMO “ANTIMPERIALISTA”
La prima considerazione è di carattere storico. Il colpo di stato degli Ufficiali liberi nel 1969 in Libia ebbe sicuramente un connotato “antimperialista”, per as distorted by its military character. But you can not ignore the real nature of the regime and, moreover, its dynamic historical regression in the last 20 years? The overthrow of the old military
Libyan monarchy of King Idris in '69 took place in the more general movement of decolonization developed after World War II: a movement that found a gap in the existence of the USSR and international expansion of its area of \u200b\u200binfluence to 'inside of the same Arab nation. Like the regime of Ben Bella and Boumedienne in Algeria then, and Nasser in Egypt (which, however, Gaddafi was inspired), the new power of Libyan officials realized undoubtedly progressive social measures: erased the vestiges of Italian colonialism, foreign military bases closed, partly nationalized foreign banks (with the acquisition of majority stakes, took possession of the oil resources of the country, launched social protection measures. It was more than sufficient for the condemnation of Gaddafi by imperialism. But it was not the "socialism" - as claimed by the Stalinist parties Arabs to justify their capitulation to nationalism - not the workers' power and popular. On the contrary.
Gaddafi On the ground preserved a social market economy, both albeit with a strong presence of public control: moreover, the "third universal theory" as its called Gaddafi dottrina sociale - con la tradizionale modestia - riconosceva apertamente il principio della proprietà privata (“sancito dal Corano”) in polemica col “comunismo totalitario”. Sul terreno politico eresse sulle rovine della vecchia monarchia un proprio regime militare e dispotico, basato sulla mistica del Capo; sulla negazione delle libertà democratiche più elementari dei lavoratori e delle masse (niente libertà sindacale, niente libertà di sciopero, niente libero confronto delle opinioni politiche nello stesso campo antimperialista...); sulla irrigimentazione attiva della società libica attraverso specifiche strutture di controllo sociale e poliziesco (i cosiddetti “comitati popolari” strettamente subject to Gaddafi as a sort of his private militia), with the balance (and between) the clans (such as never put into question, but rather taken as the power system interface), the systematic annihilation of all forms military even masked or potential opposition to absolutism (traditional Islamic Ulema from the clergy, members of the opposition to the weak domestic policy). The same "new constitution" solemnly promised by Gaddafi at the time of the overthrow of the monarchy, remained a dead letter in 40 years: and replaced by the creed of Yamahiriyya (1976) and the messianic religion of the Green Paper, of course, hand written by the Chief.
E 'is therefore completely already clear in the 70 and 80 the communist revolutionaries were certainly defend Libya's Gaddafi (as Nasser's Egypt, as Boumedienne of Algeria ...) threat of imperialism, but they could not in any way identify petit-bourgeois Bonapartist regimes in the military, or embellish the reality of those regimes. On the contrary, they had to act as opposition to the proletarian Bonapartist around a program of anti-social revolution and workers' democracy and popular: the only perspective that can consolidate and make up completely the same anti-imperialist democratic revolution. This was indeed the policy of strict independence of the class that Marx claimed against the revolutionary democracy petty bourgeois and a possible government (see address to the League of Communists in 1850) and the Communist International of Lenin and Trotsky applied towards nationalism "anti-imperialist" or semi-colonial countries (v.il 2nd Congress of the 3 rd International Symposium on the colonial question, 1920). The Stalinist bureaucracy would reverse this setting.
Adaptation of Stalinism during the Second World War, the Arab nationalism of petty bourgeois military sectors in the Middle East, was a crime against the Arab revolution and his own anti-imperialist aspirations. All Bonapartist regimes' anti-imperialist "backed by Moscow, and made possible by the existence USSR, ended one after the other with back nell'alveo imperialism and Zionism with the subordinate. A process already started in the '70s and '80s (performed by Sadat and then Mubarak in Egypt), and completed after the fall of the Berlin Wall and Stalinism internationally.
the parable of Gaddafi: FROM BONAPARTE "ANTINMPERIALISTA" A business partner (and crimes) Imperial
Gaddafi's regime was no exception. Subject still imperialist military aggression in 1986 (with the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi on the American side), and even internationally isolated in the early '90s (with the heavy international sanctions of 92-93), the scheme worked for its integration into the new international order, until his "rehabilitation" official in 2003. The end of the umbrella protection of the Kremlin, the imperialist aggression against Iraq in '91, the growing pressure of Islamic fundamentalism threatening the borders (Algeria) with a risk of penetration in Libya, Gaddafi urged in a short time a radical relocation policy. It embarked on a plan of internal liberalization, reopened its doors to foreign banks, offered lavish concessions to imperialism in the same oil field, he gave lavish contracts in the field of infrastructure capital to Italian and French, took on the role of gendarme of the ruthless policies xenophobia in the EU, opened to relax with Egypt and the Zionist state. Asking in return not only the renunciation of imperialism to overthrow the regime, but an area of \u200b\u200bactive involvement in the financial capital of the West: Libya, the first Italian bank's main shareholder (Unicredit) states in this context.
This change has had important consequences in Libya. At the oppressive nature of the dictatorship has been added to the considerable growth of social inequality, compared to salaries stops already twenty years. On the one hand, liberalization and privatization, coupled with the growing communion business with the capitalists of Europe, have increased the social privilege of the caste system from the family (wide) Gadhafi of making the political abuse of power even more obnoxious. For another, the maintenance of social assistance could not prevent the significant increase in youth unemployment (especially intellectual), a feature common to all countries of the Maghreb. The per capita income in Libya is certainly higher than in Tunisia and Egypt, but only through the traditional media of chicken. Finally, the social mixing triggered by increasing integration with foreign capital has eroded the old tribal and territorial balance, atavistic multiplying contradictions and tensions (particularly between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania), to the detriment of the stability of the regime and the unity of the army.
The truth is that Libya's history and its parable is a further lesson for all the supporters, more or less uncritically, the military regimes of "progressive" (at Chavez, for instance). Not only do these schemes do not achieve or can achieve, by definition, the power of workers and the masses, but their own autonomy from imperialism is inevitably partial, fragile, transient, sooner or later exposed to the ebb of normalization. This is the reality of the current regime of Gaddafi. Do not see it, and continue to repeat 40 years later, albeit with understandable caution, the old mythology of the Lion of the desert, do not mean any stock of past mistakes and to disarm the revolutionary politics against the backdrop of the new revolution araba.
LA SOLLEVAZIONE POPOLARE IN LIBIA: “GUERRA CIVILE” O “RIVOLUZIONE”? TANTA CONFUSIONE SOTTO IL CIELO
Ma c'è di più. Dopo aver rimosso in sede “logica” la base materiale di una possibile rivoluzione libica (se Gheddafi è antimperialista e le masse vivono bene grazie ai sussidi, perché dovrebbero fare una rivoluzione?) gli intellettuali neostaliniani negano in sede empirica l'evidenza stessa della rivoluzione in corso: si tratterebbe tuttalpiù di una “guerra civile”, ordita e preordinata dietro le quinte; e in ogni caso come si può chiamare “rivoluzione” l'innalzamento della bandiera monarchica?
Questa costruzione è un non senso. Che somma in sé l'assoluta incomprensione della realtà storica delle rivoluzioni, con l'assoluta incomprensione della concretezza degli avvenimenti in corso. Soffermiamoci su entrambi gli aspetti.
Non so come i compagni Burgio , Cararo o Dinucci immaginano una rivoluzione. Pare che la immaginino come un percorso rettilineo, segnato dalla coscienza di massa, illuminato da un chiaro programma, sorretto da un blocco sociale omogeneo. (E per questo... rinviabile alla notte dei tempi). Disgraziatamente una simile rivoluzione è sconosciuta alla storia dell'umanità. Le rivoluzioni reali, non quelle immaginarie, sono processi molto complessi. Non sono sospinte dalla coscienza ma dal bisogno e dall'odio contro l'oppressione. Proprio perché mobilitano grandi masse (altrimenti non sarebbero rivoluzioni) trascinano nell'arena della lotta i più diversi strati sociali, le più diverse culture e tradizioni, ragioni e interessi profondamente contraddittori. Così è stato sempre. E tanto più quando la rivoluzione si leva contro regimi dittatoriali pluridecennali, che per loro natura hanno bloccato per lungo tempo ogni forma di dialettica pubblica e di selezione delle rappresentanze politiche, unificando contro di sé un indistinto moto democratico per la “libertà”. E' appena il caso di ricordare che la prima rivoluzione russa contro lo zarismo del 1905 iniziò sotto le insegne del prete Gapon (poi rivelatosi agente dello Zar)... Il compito dei comunisti non è quello di negare la rivoluzione perché non corrisponde ad una forma pura ideale (inesistente), ma di intervenire nelle rivoluzioni reali per sviluppare la loro coscienza , contrastare l'egemonia di forze politiche o culturali avverse (inevitabile nella prima fase), ricondurre le aspirazioni sociali e politiche progressive delle masse ad uno sbocco di classe anticapitalista.
Le rivoluzioni arabe in corso contro regimi ventennali (Tunisia), trentennali (Egitto), quarantennali (Libia), pongono ai comunisti esattamente questo problema. I processi in corso hanno caratteristiche diverse a seconda dei diversi contesti nazionali. In particolare sono different channels and political organizers of the uprising, and the dynamics of social forces. But wherever the true unifying banner of revolutionary movements immediately was not social but political: the overthrow of regimes, the overthrow of the oppressors. That is why the policy has aggregated flag around himself deeply contradictory names, which tend to capture the scene immediately after the overthrow of tyrants. The great rise of workers' strikes in Egypt, after the fall of Mubarak in the open collision with the "new" provisional military power (and the Egyptian bourgeoisie which supports it) is emblematic in this regard. The Libyan revolution falls, with its specificity, in this framework. The flag of unifying a large part of the Libyan society is facing in the fall of Gaddafi, the punishment of his crimes, the launch of a constitution, free elections. These are the traditional claims of a democratic revolution. The flag
"monarchical"? It 's just the Libyan flag as opposed to the green flag of the dictatorship. Gaddafi that before there was a monarchy in Libya (rightly overthrown in '69) is a fact. But the flag now under appeal by the masses against Gaddafi does not express the demand for the return of the family Idris. Besides, the royalist opposition is almost non-existent in Libya, and weak in emigration, as documented by the same old Del Boca. That flag represents in symbolic terms, in the desert of political and cultural references, the point of identification and aggregation available after 40 years of the regime against the regime. In the perception of mass is the symbol of a national democratic revolution, not a counter-revolution monarchy. You can not see it? A fact
"preordained and organized, unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, and thus the long arm of" foreign forces "?. It 's a conspiracy nonsense is typical of the Stalinist mentality that ignores the facts. The chronicle of the uprising in Benghazi, leader of the revolution, is now public domain, even in detail, however, confirmed by the most disperate fonti documentali e testimonianze. Le prime manifestazioni anti regime del 15 febbraio, convocate via internet, a base prevalentemente giovanile e studentesca, sono state aggredite a fucilate da forze mercenarie direttamente guidate da Karmis, figlio di Gheddafi, che ordinava all'esercito di partecipare alla repressione. L'orrore per la carneficina compiuta, in una città già colpita ripetutamente dalla violenza criminale del regime, ha prodotto la sollevazione popolare. Gli stessi comandi dell'esercito hanno a quel punto disertato gli ordini di Gheddafi, si sono ammutinati, e hanno aperto le caserme e i depositi d'armi, consentendo l'armamento popolare. Il giorno 20 Bengasi è stata liberata: e la sua liberazione ha prodotto un effetto domino throughout the east of Libya, with similar dynamics (uprising, mutiny of troops, armament popular). Where is all this the director of a devil mysterious occult? How can you not see that the revolution is the daughter of the Libyan Arab revolution, driven by the events in Tunisia and Egypt, animated by the same desire for freedom and redemption that is going through, in different forms, all the Arab peoples? After describing the collapse of Stalinism in 89 as an international conspiracy of imperialism, as we want to represent the same plot of imperialism Arab revolution (against regimes allied imperialism ...)?
But Libya is "a civil war, not a rivoluzione”, si afferma. Ma perché, una rivoluzione non può forse trascinare con sé una guerra civile? Le grandi rivoluzioni della storia non sono state anche guerre civili? La rivoluzione inglese del 1640, la rivoluzione francese del 1789-93, la stessa rivoluzione russa dell'ottobre '17, non si sono risolte anche in guerre civili? La stessa guerra di liberazione in Italia nel 43-45 (tradita nelle sue aspirazioni rivoluzionarie dal PCI di Togliatti) non ha forse intrecciato sollevazione popolare e guerra civile? Si potrebbe continuare. E' vero: in Tunisia e in Egitto il primo passaggio della rivoluzione, con la caduta di Ben Alì e Mubarak, non ha comportato la guerra civile, nonostante le centinaia di morti assassinati; per il semplice fatto che in entrambi i casi la forza popolare ha paralizzato l'esercito, la polizia si è disgregata, lo stesso imperialismo ha premuto dall'esterno su forze militari da sé finanziate e influenzate perché evitassero un bagno di sangue dalle conseguenze imprevedibili, e cercassero di riprendere il controllo politico della situazione (cosa come si vede non facile né a Tunisi né a Il Cairo). In Libia è diverso, per un insieme di ragioni particolari: la famiglia Gheddafi non ha lo spazio di fuga disponibile per Ben Alì e Mubarak; il regime dispone, nella capitale, di uno spazio di arroccamento e tenuta militare superiore; Gheddafi controlla forze mercenarie consistenti; lo spazio di influenza e condizionamento politico of 'imperialism on Gaddafi and his military is, for historical reasons, much less than that carried on the Egyptian regime. In this context, the will to resist Gaddafi in Tripoli can drag a civil war (imperialism by offering an area of \u200b\u200bpossible intervention, just a lever in the absence of domestic policy). But why this civil war would eliminate the border between revolution and counterrevolution? Or you want to suggest, by implication, a policy of defending the revolution against the Gaddafi regime in Libya, in perfect harmony with the position taken by the regime of Chavez and Fidel Castro? In this case you gain clarity, and would have the courage to recruitment of responsibility. Certainly very challenging and revealing.
anticapitalist DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
course the full support of the Libyan revolution can not possibly lead to a naive expectation to events. The revolutionary overthrow of the Gaddafi regime is definitely a good thing but will not finish the revolution: on the contrary would open its new phase, full of uncertainties and contradictions, and therefore a new agenda of problems and tasks.
Also in Libya, as in Tunisia and Egypt - albeit with a much greater weakness and dispersion - different forces are at work involved to make the Libyan revolution to end a limited and partial or full the historic reconciliation with imperialism. The danger today is not by pan-Islamism, whose presence in the Arab revolution is now whole, very limited, and that is very marginal in the same Libya (Cyrenaica Senussia tradition is not fundamentalist). It is rather the work of the tribal areas who are interested in regaining control of the situation after the revolution - especially among young people - has shaken the dominion of the clan going beyond their borders. It comes from the military areas of the old regime who have abandoned the sinking ship, but they are not willing to give up their privileges and their social status. It comes from the enriched environment of the new Libyan grown up in the opening decade of imperialism, and often intertwined with the Western business world. These forces do not now have an axis of unification and a unique project, also because of their conflicting interests. But they have a common goal: secure the people's revolution, impede the full realization of its own democratic demands, however, prevent its trascrescenza in social revolution, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist. These are the same forces that may be interested intervention of imperialism in Libya, as a factor of political stabilization and restoration of order: an order without Gaddafi - now factor in civil war with all its risks - but it certainly marked the full restoration dominant hierarchies. The masses have arisen Libyan
an interest in the exact opposite, like the Tunisian and Egyptian masses: to prevent the betrayal of the revolution. From here, a program of action in response: to develop to the end its calls for democracy, since the demand for a truly free and sovereign Constituent Assembly that shirk clan leaders, generals, businessmen, the definition of the new political order, to develop free the people's committees who were born in Benghazi and Tabruk, broaden their social base, giving them an elective nature, progressive coordination at local and national, has already been freed from Libya: to make the tools of self-organization of workers and democratic of the people refuse to surrender their weapons ai nuovi generali, come pretendono i comandanti militari a Bengasi: ed anzi estendere l'armamento popolare, integrare parallelamente rappresentanze militari elette dai soldati nelle strutture dei comitati popolari, organizzare ovunque la propria forza indipendente. Contemporaneamente, sul piano sociale, si tratta di affermare un programma autonomo e complementare: respingere ogni apertura alle liberalizzazioni di mercato, revocare le liberalizzazioni già effettuate, nazionalizzare sotto il controllo dei lavoratori e senza indennizzo tutte le leve vitali dell'economia del paese, annullare tutti i patti subalterni realizzati dal regime con l'imperialismo (a partire dalla chiusura immediata dei campi di concentramento dei migranti d'Africa). La lotta per questo program will not only enshrine the political autonomy of the labor movement and popular by all the forces of the bourgeoisie in Libya, but would make an important contribution to the forward deployment of revolution, Egyptian and Tunisian, a crucial step.
AGAINST ALL WORK OF 'IMPERIALISM IN LIBYA. BUT NOT IN THE NAME OF THE REVOLUTION Gaddafi
E 'from this point of view, revolutionary, and not the opposite pro-Gaddafi, who is denounced and rejected any notion most clearly of imperialist intervention in Libya. If imperialism today is studying a possible intervention in Libya, Gaddafi is not because he wants to remove (also already given up). But because he wants to stop the Libyan revolution e l'estensione ulteriore della rivoluzione araba. Questo è il suo problema.
L'imperialismo non ha mai avuto scrupoli democratici e scopi umanitari. Tutta la sua storia ha militato contro la democrazia e contro l'umanità. La sua unica vocazione è il dominio sui popoli e il controllo sul pianeta. Non sono oggi le crudeltà del regime di Gheddafi a colpire la sensibilità di chi bombarda l'Afghanistan ed appoggia le barbarie del sionismo. Ma piuttosto l'instabilità politica della Libia, la messa a rischio delle sue riserve petrolifere, la possibilità di un ulteriore espansione del contagio rivoluzionario in Medio Oriente a tutto danno degli interessi strategici dell'imperialismo e dello Stato sionista, in uno scacchiere decisivo degli world balance, present and future. Intervening in Libya, behind the hypocritical pretext of humanitarian relief, it could mean regaining a lever in the whole Maghreb, developments and opportunities influence the political processes underway in the region, to weigh all the way its deterrent force. Moreover the same inter-imperialist contradictions pulling in the same direction. United States and Great Britain are the most active in supporting the view action, because they think to replace the imperialist interests most affected European (Italy and France), and open a wider channel of direct intervention in Africa according anticinese. France would like to avoid this maneuver, in defense of its old sphere of influence in Africa. But I do not know how. The Italian imperialism, the main victim of the fall of Gaddafi (and not just for the refugee issue) seek to recover the delay at the last minute to avoid being cut off from any division of spheres of influence. What 's the only real unifying element of imperialism in this elbowing of all against all? The settlement of the Arab revolution. For this same reason, the defense and development of the Arab revolution, not rare, should be the unifying element of all the consistent anti-imperialist forces. "Both the Libyan people arose to settle accounts with Gaddafi, not the old colonial powers against the Libyan people and the Arab"
This word is even more important in Italy, the old power dominatrix Libya today celebrates the centenary of the Italian colonial invasion exact from the government liberal "progressive" of Giolitti (1911), under the pressure of the Banco di Roma . "Hands off from Libya, full support for the Libyan revolution against Gaddafi and Italian imperialism" is the rightful claim of the labor movement in our country. In keeping with the opposition that the invasion of Libya Italian Socialist Party, argued in 1911. And as a true act of reparation against the barbaric oppression Italian on the Libyan people for nearly half a century (the extermination of the Libyan resistance, use of poison gas, launching of the concentration camps ... even then the "democratic" Giolitti). But this position makes sense if progressive moves by the support the revolution, not to counter (or untenable neutrality between the Libyan regime and the insurgent people).
COMMUNISTS IN THE FACE OF LIBYA AND STALIN: A REVEALING DISCUSSION
In conclusion. This confrontation on the issue between the Libyan revolutionary forces neostaliste, by no means simply a manifestation of a divergence occasional, albeit important, of "foreign policy." On the contrary: it represents, from a particular angle, the litmus test of opposing orientations.
Un partito rivoluzionario che assume il comunismo non come etichetta ideologica, ma come programma per la conquista del potere da parte dei lavoratori e delle masse - in Italia come su scala internazionale - è portato da questo stesso programma a riconoscere i processi rivoluzionari ovunque si manifestino, a difenderli, a intervenire sulle loro inevitabili contraddizioni, a cercare di sviluppare una loro direzione politica alternativa nella prospettiva del governo dei lavoratori e delle masse povere.
Gruppi o partiti che invece si richiamano al comunismo come eredità ideologica dello stalinismo, senza programma rivoluzionario, senza lotta reale per il potere, sono portati ad assumere come riferimento internazionale centrale non la dinamica reale della lotta Class and revolution, but political and diplomatic positioning of its "field" reference state: once the Soviet Union, even when in the name of the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy they were betraying the revolution or the English Italian resistance, and today, more modestly, China or Venezuela's Chavez, even when it means betraying (in this case, fortunately without consequences, direct) the Libyan revolution and Arabic.
And 'the proof, once again, the break with Stalinism and his school is the condition necessary to guide the revolutionary politics in the transition period we are living.
Marco Ferrando
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